Phase 2: Acquisition of a Space Refueling Station

Obtaining the International Space Station


The acquisition/leasing or construction of a space refueling platform, after successfully demonstrating the extraction and storage capabilities, will be vital to achieving LEO Speedwagon’s business model.  The International Space Station (ISS) was identified as the best platform to conduct our business model of providing a spacecraft refueling station in LEO.  The Robotic Refueling Mission (RRM), which is a technology demonstration on the ISS testing tools, technologies, and techniques to refuel and repair satellites in orbit (NASA: What is RRM, n.d.), would provide LEO Speedwagon with an existing refueling capability.  The RRM saves LEO Speedwagon money in research and development, acquisitions, manufacturing, and testing.  The current plan for the ISS is to cease funding after 2024 and allow it to deorbit.  NASA and Roscosmos are planning to build a new station using some modules from the ISS (Nield, 2016), and want to include more partner nations (Foust, 2015).  Roscosmos’s willingness to extend the life of its ISS modules doesn’t necessarily equate to continued Russian partnership on the ISS; it may indicate Russia’s desire to use its modules to build a station of its own. This may lead to some difficulties in reaching an agreement for purchasing Russian modules and other international partners may not be as excited as the U.S. to let a private company take over their modules. This could lead to a rise in costs, a loss of particular modules, or a loss in access or privileges to parts of the station. Depending on the terms of the lease agreement this risk could be fairly low. Other than Russia, no other partner currently has plans to use their modules past the ISS life span.

Our group’s strategy hinges on drafting a MOU for sale and transfer of liability of all modules of the ISS to LEO Speedwagon.  Another MOU would be sought with each international partner currently contributing to the ISS to continue their role in the future refueling mission.  Additionally, team LEO Speedwagon will encourage further international cooperation by signing bilateral or multilateral agreements similar to the ISS bilateral agreements signed between NASA and European Space Agency (Goldin & Rodata, 1998); NASA and the Russian Space Agency (Goldin & Koptev, 1998); NASA and the government of Japan (NASA, 1998); and NASA and the Canadian Space Agency (Goldin & Evans, 1998).  Furthermore, MOUs can be written between our group and other governments or commercial entities similar to the MOU between Planetary Resources and the Government of Luxembourg (Klotz, 2016) and Deep Space Industries and the Government of Luxembourg (Calandrelli, 2016). Lastly, it may be necessary to extend offers of cooperation with other interested parties outside of current ISS partners.  Such outside parties may include the Government of Luxembourg, BRIC countries (Brazil, India, South Africa), and energy companies such as ExxonMobil and British Petroleum.  There is also a growing need for space infrastructure and this refueling platform can be a good solution for multiple organizations.

Funding the Mission


This project is not low cost but does serve as the critical stepping stone for vital space infrastructure that will be needed by private companies and government space agencies alike. Companies such as Planetary Resources rely on a wealthy elite to fund their projects with the understanding that there will be a return on their investment. This may not be feasible as the sole option for this project since there are only so many investors to go around and many are invested already, it is a more expensive but also more comprehensive project, and it would probably service government agencies very heavily. Therefore the alternative would be to make funding from international partners an important part of the station.  Agreements could be made that has government agencies provide maintenance in exchange for refueling or perhaps operations and control. This approach could be used until a steady customer base is established and a newer more permanent private station is made. The risk of failure would be much lower if such agreements could be made between the partnering nations.

After the details regarding the purchase/lease of the ISS have been finalized, a contract will be drafted with all member nations/space agencies contributing to the ISS with our group to to retrofit/refurbish all modules as we see fit to accomplish our refueling mission.  The group’s vision for the retrofit/refurbish will be modeled after Space Adventures lease of MIR from Roscomos (Dubbs & Paat-Dahlstrom, 2011).   Mircorp essentially entered into a lease agreement with Energia in the same way a renter would for an apartment.  Energia served the role of landlord and was responsible for all maintenance, political issues, and mechanical problems on the station but would hold a 51% share in Mir (Dubbs & Paat-Dahlstrom, 2011). Mircorp would be the tenants and got exclusive control of visitors, 2-3 manned soyuz launches a year and 2-3 progress cargo launches per year. Mircorp would pay a “rent” of $285 million per year in 2016 dollars to Energia in exchange for these rights. This project may differ in costs, in particular because of the international cooperation required of the ISS, but the idea would remain the same.  Before Mircorp finished taking over the operations of Mir, the station entered an unstable orbit that could not be recovered before entering Earth’s atmosphere. This is ultimately what led to the failure of Mircorp’s space tourism despite the interest. A similar situation could happen with the ISS if appropriate steps are not taken to prevent it.  The projected upkeep cost is approximately between $1.25 billion/year (current U.S. upkeep cost) and $3 billion/year (How Much Does It Cost, 2013; NASA: OIG, 2014).  According to the European Space Agency (ESA), the cost for the space station over the last 30 years has been roughly $100 billion.

Currently, there is a debate about how effective the ISS will be by 2024. NASA has said that they foresee no major obstacles to extending the mission but the office of the inspector general has concluded three major areas that need to be addressed if the ISS is expected to operate at full capacity (NASA: OIG, 2014).  Additionally, the station is getting older and some of the major components are falling into disrepair either because they cannot be repaired or it is too cost prohibitive. The primary problem is the solar panels which need to be replaced to continue to perform optimally. The volume of the current transportation systems is not large enough to carry full solar panels up to the station making it difficult to even get them there in the first place (NASA: OIG, 2014). Beyond that, not all parts of the solar panels can be reached from the current infrastructure of the ISS requiring space shuttle type missions to replace them. If they cannot be replaced, the the power supply needs to be augmented by some other compatible system.

Important Current Space Station Technology: Electrical Power System


The solar panels are degrading at a rate that would not provide sufficient power for current ISS operations. Currently, the electrical power subsystem consists of 164 solar panels, containing a total of 32,800 solar cells (Davies, 2016), that provide approximately 120-160 Kw of total power to the station. The expected degradation rates for the solar array wings maximum power point current, voltage and power are 1.8% per year, 1% per year and 2.7% per year, respectively (Kerslake & Gustafson, 2003).  The total power generated from the solar array wings today is 88-128 Kw less than beginning-of-life outputs.  The solar arrays provide enough power for the station while in direct sunlight during most of its 90 minute orbit, but for the 35 min eclipse periods Nickel-hydrogen (Ni-H) batteries provide power (Boeing, n.d.).  The current batteries on the ISS are reaching their end-of-life and will be replaced with Lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries (LIB).  Some of the current issues with the electrical system on board ISS is that the equipment wears out. As micro dust in space chips away at solar panels reducing their efficiency, and as batteries corrode and wear out, the demand for more power is increasing with each mission. The whole system is due for an upgrade. Being able to take parts of the ISS and refitting them for a new mission at a refueling station would not only save time and money, but also upgrade and retrofit the existing platform so it could be operated safely, without fear of power failures.

The power supply will need to be augmented in some way or the solar panels will need to be replaced but this leads to the second problem.  The current delivery systems for transporting materials to the ISS are very limited in volume. This restricts what can actually be replaced making it difficult to do large scale refurbishment. For the purposes of this project, it is possible that a larger manned mission could be planned for servicing the station that would supply our various needs. This could potentially drive up costs but may also be part of the arrangement made with the governing bodies that the station is purchased from.

Given the current electrical production capabilities, and modern electrolysis techniques using 100% of the available EPS production, Only a few kilograms of hydrogen could be produced per day, assuming 100% efficiency of production facilities requiring 30-50 KW/hr per kg (Bertuccioli et al., 2014). Given the power requirements, changes in mission scope are likely needed, as there are practical limits of how many more solar panels can be added to the station. The “easy” fix would be to install a small nuclear reactor due to its ability to supply long term, stable power, but there are two main issues with nuclear reactors; the logistical and political conflicts that nuclear power causes, and the science needed behind having a functioning reactor in space. The political aspect of nuclear reactors would be most relevant to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty which states,

“States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”

Although a nuclear reactor on a spacecraft is not necessarily a weapon, it can still have long-lasting environmental effects if it were to malfunction and re-enter the atmosphere without burning up completely.  Nuclear radiation could be spread across a wide area affecting millions of people depending on the crash site on Earth.  One example to consider is the Cosmos 954, a Soviet nuclear powered surveillance satellite, that crashed into the Northwest Territories of Canada in 1978.  Luckily the satellite crashed in a largely unpopulated region; cleanup efforts conducted by the US and Canada amounted to $6M which the USSR only paid $3M.

Any nuclear powered spacecraft to launch from the US has to follow specific procedures to assess the safety of the launch site and the environmental impact of the launch to the surrounding area.  Typically, the Department of Energy will prepare a Safety Analysis Report and a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which will be reviewed by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP).  The INSRP will then have to prepare a Safety Evaluation Report to identify any possible accident scenarios.  The mission agency will then submit the FSAR and the SER to the President Office of Science and Technology Policy to obtain the launch approval (Gini, 2011).

Reactors on Earth rely on gravity to operate the cooling cycle (thermal driving head of coolant water) for the reactor to remove decay heat and provide a cyclic water flow to the steam generators. Obviously, this is why a space environment would cause an issue with a reactor. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) work because the heat that is produced from fission is directly converted into power. They are usually used for deep space probes that are so far away that solar energy is insufficient to acquire the necessary power to operate its equipment and sensors.  Some space probes that have used RTG are Galileo and both Voyager I and II (Sellers, 2007).   It is minimal though, 100W on average, which isn’t enough to power most toasters. Specific types of reactors could be modified to work in space, but shielding needed is extremely heavy for launch vehicles to bring up, and primary systems of reactors need constant human monitoring, which is impractical for the LEO space station.

In short, the current electrical production of the International Space Station would be sufficient for a “technology demonstrator”, with potential to make fuel for small craft and satellites, using a small “boulder” as feedstock, but to supply two million liters of fuel for a Saturn-V like spacecraft by consuming a large asteroid would be futile.

Future of the Space Station


Lastly, as the station ages replacement parts will be needed with increasing frequency. These replacements can often be needed on short notice and it is difficult to predict which parts will be needed and when. Some of these failures will not have a major impact on this project because they are tied to the life support system. Since this mission is an unmanned station, those failures will not be a major problem. However, some of the major failures have been to the cooling systems and the computer control systems and required EVAs to fix (NASA: OIG, 2014). If repairs are needed rapidly that could be a problem. In the event of a major failure that cannot be replaced quickly, a spare mining vehicle that has been retrofitted to act as a storage tank will be left docked to the station. Any fuel currently stored will be sent to this spare vehicle and salvaged later to continue the mission. See table 1 for a summary of the major risks to the station for this mission.

In the event some member States cooperating on the ISS mission refuse to the lease/purchase and assumption of liability MOUs, then LEO Speedwagon will purchase inflatable modules from Bigelow Aerospace to add capacity (see Mission Objective 3), or replace lost capacity to the existing ISS infrastructure.

“The world of low Earth orbit belongs to industry. You need to understand where we’re going. A Bigelow module may be the next thing that begins to replace some of the functions of the International Space Station. Low Earth orbit infrastructure belongs to industry… If we don’t have a viable, vibrant low Earth orbit infrastructure supported by them [commercial industry], we’re not getting there [Mars].”


– Charles Bolden, NASA Administrator, January 26, 2015

If the purchase/lease agreements with all member States cooperating on the ISS mission were to fail, it will be necessary to construct a new station.  If acquiring or renting the ISS modules is not feasible, then purchase contracts will need to be negotiated between the company(s) supplying the materials for the new refueling stations infrastructure.

If all efforts to purchase/lease the ISS, and attempts to purchase Bigelow modules fail, then it will be necessary to reach out to the China National Space Administration (CNSA) to lease/buy/partner for use of the Shenzhou or older Tiangong stations.  Naturally, this option has many complicating factors as the U.S. government has legally barred any space technology from being sold to the Chinese government via the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR 126.1) and Export Administration Regulation (EAR).  This option is risky as it means NASA will not partner with LEO Speedwagon since cooperation with CNSA is discouraged. Table 2 provides a summary of these alternatives for this mission.


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